



The FutureTPM project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 779391.

Introduction to FutureTPM

Project status and today's agenda

1st Workshop, 19th October 2018, Lisbon

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General Project Information

- Project reference: 779391
- Project start: 1st January 2018
- Duration: 3 years
- Total costs/EC contribution:
EUR € 4,868,890
- 14 partners from 9 different
European countries
- Website: www.futuretpm.eu



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
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FutureTPM Mission

- Quantum-Resistant Trusted Platform Module (QR TPM)
- Full range of **implementation** environments
 - ◆ hardware-TPM (demonstrator)
 - ◆ software-TPM (demonstrator)
 - ◆ virtual-TPM (demonstrator)
- Formal **security analysis**
- **Run-time risk assessment** towards fine-grained trust based on the envisioned use cases

Why QR TPM?



Current state: TPM's cryptographic algorithms

Cryptographic Co-processor

- Asymmetric encryption
- Symmetric encryption
- Signatures & DAA
- Message authentication code
- Hash functions
- Key exchange

TPM 1.2 supports

- RSA encryption
- RSA signature
- RSA-DAA
- SHA-1
- HMAC
- AES (optional)

TPM 2.0 supports

- Asymmetric encryption
 - ◆ RSA encryption and EC encryption
- Symmetric encryption
 - ◆ AES, SM4, Triple DES, ...
- Signature
 - ◆ RSA signature and EC signature
- DAA
 - ◆ EC-DAA
- Message authentication code
 - ◆ HMAC
- Hash functions
 - ◆ SHA-1, SHA-256, SM3, ...
- Key exchange
 - ◆ ECDH

When a large-scale quantum computer becomes a reality

Cryptographic Co-processor

- Asymmetric encryption
- Symmetric encryption
- Signatures & DAA
- Message authentication code
- Hash functions
- Key exchange

TPM 1.2
supports

- RSA encryption **BROKEN**
- RSA signature **BROKEN**
- RSA-DAA **BROKEN**
- SHA-1
- HMAC
- AES (optional)

TPM 2.0 supports

- Asymmetric encryption
 - ◆ RSA encryption and EC encryption **BROKEN**
- Symmetric encryption
 - ◆ AES, SM4, Triple DES, ...
- Signature
 - ◆ RSA signature and EC signature **BROKEN**
- DAA
 - ◆ EC-DAA **BROKEN**
- Message authentication code
 - ◆ HMAC
- Hash functions
 - ◆ SHA-1, SHA-256, SM3, ...
- Key exchange
 - ◆ ECDH **BROKEN**

Three types of TPM QR algorithms

- Symmetric algorithms
 - ◆ Hash, MAC, symmetric encryption
 - ◆ Existing algorithms will not directly be broken, but key/block lengths may need to be increased
- Conventional asymmetric algorithms
 - ◆ Encryption, signature, key exchange
 - ◆ Existing algorithms will be broken
 - ◆ Many QR algorithms have been developed (e.g., submissions to NIST PQC)
- Asymmetric privacy-preserving algorithms
 - ◆ Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)
 - ◆ Not in the scope of NIST
 - ◆ Not much research so far

Other post-quantum crypto projects

- **PQCRYPTO**
 - ◆ Design of high-security post-quantum PK systems
- **SAFECrypto**
 - ◆ Practical, robust and physically secure post-quantum crypto solutions
- **PROMETHEUS**
 - ◆ Quantum-resistant privacy-preserving cryptographic mechanisms

FutureTPM Mission

Mission: *Design a QR TPM covering the full range of implementation environments coupled with formal security analysis and run-time risk assessment, and evaluated under assumptions of realistic deployment scenarios*

Design and development of a holistic TPM-based framework

Threat security analysis for TPM cryptographic functionality


Identification and implementation of a reactive, run-time risk assessment model

Validation of applicability, usability, effectiveness and value of FutureTPM concept

FutureTPM Mission (cont)

TPM as a major building block for enhanced security & privacy in various application domains

Secure & Dependable Communication	Authenticity and Integrity	Privacy and Data protection
Security Hardware	Data consistency	Security Architecture




- E-Payment
- Activity Tracking
- Device Management

Performance & Efficiency	Cost	Security-Processes/Management
Security Evolution & Maintenance	Security Metrics	

Reactive security mechanisms & updates

FutureTPM Conceptual Architecture

- **FutureTPM QR Design:**
 - ◆ QR Crypto Primitives
- **FutureTPM Implementation:**
 - ◆ HW, SW, VM-based
 - ◆ Secure Storage, Attestation
- **Risk Management:**
 - ◆ Risks, threats, assets, attack types, vulnerabilities, control elements
 - ◆ Fine-grains security policies
- **Security Modelling:**
 - ◆ Threats (physical/software/remote) to be considered



TPM Services

- **Attestation**
- **Protected Storage**
- **Platform Authentication**
- ...

Cryptographic Primitives

- Hash functions
- Block ciphers
- Digital Signatures
- Public-key Encryption & Key Exchange
- Direct Anonymous Attestation

Root of Trust (RoT)

RoT is hardware, firmware, and/or software that is inherently trusted to perform a vital security function.

TPM Mobile

TPM Mobile offers a hardware root of trust in the device for secure transaction, secure storage of keys and certificates and integrity assurance



Self-encrypting drive

SED solutions based on TCG specifications enable integrated encryption and access control within the protected hardware of the drive




Some of the TPM applications devised and endorsed by the members of TCG




Cloud Computing

Trusted Computing concepts allow cloud users to establish trust, exchange information about the platforms they use and assure compliance to agreed policies




Trusted Network Connect

TNC specs enable endpoint posture assessment, intelligent access control and security automation for compliance with network/enterprise security policies



Secure Mobile Wallet and Payments

- Use of **FreePOS** application as a testbed developed by **INDEV, GR**
 - ◆ One of the top finance apps in Greece – tens of thousands active users
 - ◆ **Hardware-based TPM**
- **Token-based** authentication
 - ◆ *Depends on OS level security*
- OAuth 2.0 with PCI compliant services
- **Confidentiality**
 - ◆ TPC key storage persistency -> token storage
- **Integrity**
 - ◆ HMAC digital signatures for financial data integrity
- **Authentication**
- **Key Exchange**



Personal Activity and Health Kit Data Tracking

- Use of **S5 Tracker** application as a testbed developed by **SUITE5 Data Intelligence Solutions, UK**
- **Data Anonymization and Privacy Preservation**
 - ◆ *Generation of “User Personas”*
 - ◆ **Software-based TPM**
- **Privacy**, confidentiality and security at the edge
 - ◆ Direct Anonymous Attestation
- **Data Integrity**
 - ◆ HMAC digital signatures for financial data integrity
- **Secure Data Sharing**
 - ◆ No data leakage



2 Phase Testing

- **1st Phase Testing:**
 - ◆ Internal, small-scale, lab-test
 - ◆ **M18** (MS4) - first release of SW-based TSS + QR TPM + RA framework
 - ◆ **M21** (MS5) - first release of FutureTPM framework
 - ◆ **M24** – 1st Demonstration Phase + 2nd FutureTPM Workshop
- **2nd Phase Testing:**
 - ◆ Internal, large-scale, hybrid test
 - ◆ **M27** (MS7) – Final release of FutureTPM framework (including all TPM implementations)
 - ◆ **M33** (MS8) – 2nd Demonstration Phase + 3rd FutureTPM Workshop

08:30 - 09:00 FutureTPM Workshop Registration

Session 1 - Welcome and Introduction to FutureTPM Workshop

09:00 - 09:20 Introduction to FutureTPM
Project status and today's agenda
Liquan Chen & Thanassis Giannetsos
(University of Surrey)

09:20 - 10:00 The Future of Trusted Computing
Steve Hanna
(Trusted Computing Group)

10:00 - 10:40 NIST Cryptographic Standards for Trusted Platform in Quantum Era
Lily Chen
(NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology)

10:40 - 11:00 Coffee Break

Session 2 - The use of Trusted Computing towards Enhanced Security and Privacy

11:00 - 11:20 Comprehensive Remote Attestation for Device Management
Roberto Sassu & Silviu Vlasceanu
(Huawei)

11:20 - 11:40 Empowering Trust and Security on Sharing Personal Activity Data
A FutureTPM Use Case
Thanassis Giannetsos
(University of Surrey)

11:40 - 12:00 Secure Mobile Wallet and Payments
Fanis Sklinos
(Indev Software SA)

12:00 - 13:00 Lunch Break

13:00 - 13:20 A Platform Manufacturer's View of TPMs
Carey Huscroft (HP Labs)

13:20 - 13:45 Thales and Trusted Computing
Adrian Waller (Thales UK)

Session 3 - Other EU Initiatives towards QR Crypto

13:45 - 14:15 Results of PQCrypto (ICT-645622)
Tanja Lange
(University of Eindhoven)

14:15 - 14:45 SAFEcrypto: Secure Architectures of Future Emerging Cryptography
Adrian Waller (Thales UK)

14:45 - 15:15 PROMETHEUS or how to provide Quantum-Resistant Privacy-Preserving Cryptographic Mechanisms
Sébastien Canard (Orange)

15:15 - 15:45 Using and Breaking Hardware Security Anchors
David Oswald
(University of Birmingham)

15:45 - 16:00 Coffee Break

Panel Discussion

16:00 - 16:45 Innovating with Trusted Computing: The Journey towards the implementation of a Quantum-Resistant TPM
Moderator: Liquan Chen
Panelists: Lily Chen, Steve Hanna, Christian Hanser, Carey Huscroft, Tanja Lange, Adrian Waller

Session 4 - Quantum-Resistant TSS Implementation

16:45 - 17:05 PQC TSS and PQC TPM - a Prototype
Andreas Fuchs
(Fraunhofer SIT)

17:05 - 17:25 Implementation of the FutureTPM QR Hardware TPM Demonstrator
Christian Hanser (Infineon)

17:25 - 17:45 PQ Direct Anonymous Attestation
Paulo Martins (INESC-ID)

17:45 - 18:00 FutureTPM Workshop Closing Remarks
Liquan Chen & Thanassis Giannetsos
(University of Surrey)

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